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 Psychologists have long appreciated that many real-world decisions 
require a balance of expediency and accuracy in gathering evidence.  Often the 
best decisions are made when there is some lingering uncertainty.  But how 
much?  Depending on the situation, choosing the right amount of evidence can 
often be a fine line between making a rash decision and being indecisive.   
 Psychologists have been reluctant to pursue studying peoples' abilities 
to judge the correct "threshold" for probabilistic decisions.  There are two 
reasons for this:   First, the question of a decision threshold, or "when should I 
stop gathering evidence?" is confounded by the larger issue of how subjects 
choose and integrate that evidence.  Subjects may have a decision threshold 
that is consistently sub-optimal with respect to a model that does not consider 
cognitive constraints.  However, subjects may actually be choosing the right 
vii 
amount of information given their own cognitive limitations.  Second, it has 
been shown that people often use specific heuristics in making probabilistic 
decisions.  In this case, defining a decision threshold would be largely 
dependent on the heuristic and task, thus preventing a study of decision 
thresholds that is widely applicable.  
 The research presented here addresses both of these concerns.  I 
defined a task where the ideal decision threshold is clearly defined, requiring 
some evidence, but not an exhaustive search. Furthermore, this threshold can 
be precisely manipulated by changes in the reward structure.  Although it is 
possible to use a "sufficing" or sub-optimal heuristic, subjects are given a 
significant financial incentive to fully integrate as much evidence as possible.  
Lastly, and most importantly, a general model of people's cognitive limitations 
is applied to the traditional normative model.  This enhancement allows a more 
refined study of humans' ability to place their decision threshold according to 
environmental conditions.  
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Chapter 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 Almost all decisions are made with uncertainty.  Because people (or 
any living organism) are not omniscient, they have to make decisions with 
limited information about the world.  Usually, people have the option of 
gathering some amount of evidence before making each decision.  Thus, 
humans have to implicitly answer the question, "how much evidence should I 
gather?"    In almost all cases, people decide to stop gathering evidence for a 
decision with a remaining chance they might be wrong.  
 This remaining uncertainty exists regardless of the time and effort 
humans take to make a decision.   For example, buying a house is arguably 
among the most important decisions in life.  Though people take months to 
deliberate on this decision, it is impossible to purchase a house entirely without 
risk.  On the other hand, the task of visual object recognition is one where 
people continuously make many decisions over the course of a single second.    
As people automatically gather visual evidence to make decisions about the 
world, they are often unaware of the remaining uncertainty in their visual 
interpretations.  However, many popular optical illusions highlight the specific 
instances in which this automatic process guesses incorrectly.  
 These two examples suggest that it is not only common, but in fact 
necessary to make decisions with remaining uncertainty.  Otherwise, people 
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would rarely buy houses or recognize objects!   Furthermore, these examples 
also show that the world is a difficult environment that requires a balance of 
accuracy and expediency in probabilistic decisions.   Many potential 
homeowners have regretted the decision to wait to gather more information 
about a house because it was bought by someone else before the potential 
buyer could make up their mind.   On the other hand, rushing to buy a house 
before adequately appraising the many risks could lead to financial hardship.  
 It should also be clear that humans are not perfect in judging how much 
uncertainty is too much, or not enough.  Everyone has had the experience of 
hindsight telling them they made a hasty decision. In this case, a person's 
"decision threshold" for gathering evidence was set too low. For example, most 
people have clothes that were bought and never worn, or have racks of CDs 
that are rarely played.  It is easy to look at these items and wish "if I had only 
thought a bit longer" about these purchases. People who have an abundance of 
these items could be argued to have a perpetually low decision threshold, or 
continually make rash or hasty choices. Conversely, a high decision threshold 
could be characterized as indecisive.  A relatively common trait, constant 
indecisiveness can be viewed as weak and a sign of depression.   In certain 
fields such medicine and the military, indecisiveness can often lead to the loss 
of life.  
3 
 Though it seems like studying peoples' decision thresholds would be 
valuable, this topic has not been extensively studied by psychologists.  Overall, 
humans make decisions on such a wide range of time and conscious effort that 
any useful study would fail to apply across the entire space. For example, it is 
unlikely that the same processes or neural mechanisms go into buying a house 
and recognizing an object. However, even if you restrict the scope of this 
investigation to short-term decisions that are often used to study probabilistic 
reasoning, the issue of balancing expediency and accuracy has not been 
thoroughly explored.  This lack of attention to the issue has been due to two 
reasons.  First, the question of a decision threshold, or "when should I stop 
gathering evidence," has been confounded by the larger issue of how subjects 
choose and integrate that evidence. It is unclear whether they chose sub-
optimal amounts of information due to a specific bias, or instead due to some 
cognitive limitation in integrating the evidence.  In fact, subjects who seem to 
place their decision thresholds sub-optimally when compared to a perfect 
integrator of evidence may be actually performing ideally with respect to their 
specific cognitive limitations. The few early attempts to look at decision 
thresholds have been undermined by this confound (Green & Swets 1961; 
Busemeyer, & Rappaport, 1988; Myung & Busemeyer, 1989).  Second, it has 
been shown (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974) that people often use specific 
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heuristics in making probabilistic decisions.  In this case, defining a decision 
threshold would be largely dependent on the heuristic and task, thus preventing 
a study of decision thresholds that is widely applicable.  For these two reasons, 
it may seem like the very idea of a decision threshold may not be even be a 
concept that is widely applicable.  
 It is the contention of this research that many advances in probabilistic 
reasoning after Kahneman & Tversky have shown a context in which the 
concept of a decision threshold may be useful. For example, other researchers 
later showed that people perform close to ideally when they implicitly learn 
these probabilities through experience (Gluck & Bower, 1988).  In fact, a large 
amount of research over the past few decades has gone into the distinction 
between explicit and implicit processing of probabilistic information, 
(Schacter, 1987, Squire 1992; Maddox 2005), especially in the kind of task that 
can elicit either type of thinking. While explicit thinking about probabilities 
may be difficult to study systematically, the simpler implicit processes can be 
easily modeled. It is my contention that many daily probabilistic judgments are 
done without much conscious thought, and we can use the past decades of 
implicit/explicit processing research as a guide in developing a task that will 
cause subjects to use mostly this type of reasoning when making a probabilistic 
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judgment.  Thus, the issue of decision threshold placement, balancing accuracy 
and expediency, may be studied and applied to a wide variety of judgments.  
 As some decision-making researchers have looked to study simpler 
decisions, psychophysicists and neuroscience researchers have built up from 
studying perceptual processes and begun to ask questions about how people 
make perceptual judgments.  Starting from the discovery of cortical neurons 
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Figure 1: Context; This graph shows the task and everyday decision in the 
context of both time and level of conscious reasoning. On the left, we wish 
to aim for a decision below the level at which heuristics apply but not an 
entirely automatic process. In the middle, we aim between probabilistic 
and perceptual judgments. On the right, these decisions are made within a 
matter of seconds  
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that are dedicated to motion perception (Newsome & Pare, 1988), researchers 
have moved on to develop a detailed understanding of how people integrate 
evidence when making perceptual decisions based on motion signals.   
Diffusion models have accurately modeled the trade-off between their speed 
and accuracy (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1988, Green & Swets, 1966) in making a 
perceptual judgment.  Furthermore, further research has identified a section of 
the cortex (lateral intraparietal or LIP) that seems to reflect the integration of 
noisy information (Shadlen & Newsome 2001; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002).  
More specifically, the firing rate of these neurons seems to correlate with the 
relative confidence in correctly making one perceptual decision over another 
(Shadlen, et al., 1996). Recently, research done on monkeys has traded the 
noisy motion signal for a symbolic cue.  Instead of viewing moving dot 
patterns, the monkey sees a sequential pattern of symbolic cues, each one 
previously associated with a certain degree of probabilistic evidence. The 
macaques' LIP seems to reflect integrated probabilistic evidence, expressed as 
the log of the likelihood ratio, whether the signal is an estimate of internal 
perceptual noise or an external probability (Yang & Shadlen, 2007).   Though 
it is not clear that a direct corresponding area of the human brain is clearly 
defined, this research suggests the possibility that not only are people capable 
of integrating probabilistic information across multiple sequential cues, but 
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also that this signal has an explicit neural representation in the brain.  
However, a remaining unknown in these studies is why monkeys choose to 
stop after they reach a certain amount of evidence.    
 This dissertation capitalizes on this rich understanding of perceptual 
and short-term probabilistic decisions, using this knowledge of sequential 
integration to investigate the issue of decision threshold placement given an 
environmental reward structure.  The task is a simple sequential task that is 
designed to isolate the question of decision threshold placement from 
Figure 2: Research Outline: An analysis scheme extracts six 
descriptive variables from either subject or model data.  Sub-
optimalities representing cognitive limitations are introduced to ideal 
task performance.  Parameters representing individual limitations are 
found by matching model behavior to the subject, based on the six 
descriptive variables.  
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perceptual considerations and higher-order issues like heuristic processing. The 
basic scheme of the research here is described in Figure 2.  Beginning with the 
ideal performance as a template, we introduce plausible cognitive limitations 
as a way to match subjects overall decision behavior (Chapter 4).  In Chapter 
5, I devise an analysis scheme that reduces either subject or model behavior to 
six descriptive variables, encapsulating the data's decision threshold, a measure 
of noise, and overall sampling behavior and performance. These variables 
provide a diagnostic for matching model behavior to subject behavior.  In 
Chapter 6 & 7, I show that reasonable model parameters yield behavior that 
closely matches each individual subject, and that we can evaluate the 
optimality of subjects' decision threshold placement with regards to their 
cognitive limitations. In this way, this research provides an example of how 
current understanding of human probabilistic reasoning can be applied to look 
at the issue of decision thresholds.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPORTANCE OF COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS 
 
 This chapter uses a modified version of a signal detection task by 
Kooky & Healy (1981) to illustrate the importance of acknowledging cognitive 
limitations when discussing optimality.  In this task, the subject is 
presented with a number representing the height of a single person.  The object 
is to guess whether the height is of a man or a woman.  The subject can either 
decide the gender or request another sample of another height of a person of 
Figure 3: Hypothetical Distributions of heights for men and women.  In 
red, the logarithm of the likelihood ratio of the two density functions is 
proportional to the height of a person.  Thus, under this scale (logLR), 
the relative strength of evidence of a single height for either distribution 
is proportional to the difference between the height and 5.5'.  Using 
another method is to use Luce choice, and take one distribution divided 
by the sum of the two distributions, giving p(one distribution | sample).  
Either method, by summing the logLR or using Bayes’ Rule can be used 
to ideally update the evidence of each height.
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the same gender.  The costs of the game are as follows: correct answers yield 
20 points, incorrect answers cost -90 points, and each additional height costs a 
single point.   
 Given that the subject knows that the average height of a man is 6' and 
women 5' and both (normal) distributions have a standard deviation of 1 foot 
(hypothetically), how should one play the game? Suppose the first height given 
happens to be 5'6".  It would seem prudent not to guess since it is equally 
likely to be a man or woman.   However, if the next height was 7 feet tall, one 
might be fairly sure that the person is a man. However, what if one begins 
receiving heights of 5'9"?  It's possible that these are women, but after 
choosing another few samples, the result is six heights, all 5'9".  In this case, 
the probability is pretty likely that all of these heights are for men.  But, should 
you risk 90 points?  
11 
  
 The purpose of this task is to mimic the condition in which the optimal 
behavior lies somewhere in between a random guess and an exhaustive 
gathering of evidence. One can find the optimal behavior with a simple 
simulation using Bayes’ Rule and the knowledge of the distributions to update 
Figure 4: Expected rewards curves are shown for decision thresholds in 
a signal detection task (d' = 1). .   Each curve is labeled with an N-step 
memory: observations greater than N steps are “forgotten”.  Notice the 
peaks of the curves differ according to the memory allocation.  The 
blue lines describe curves according to the reward structure: (correct: 
20 pts, incorrect: -90 pts, each observation -1 pt. The red lines describe 
curves according to the reward structure: (correct: 18 pts, incorrect: -89 
pts, each observation -4 pts. 
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the probability of one of the distributions, given a sequence of heights.  
Repeated simulations of the game are shown above where the gender of the 
series of items was decided after the accumulated probability for one gender 
exceeded a certain probability.  Two different reward structures (red and blue 
lines) are shown, yielding two different curves on the y-axis (average score).  
 As one can see above, if one has infinite memory the optimal decision 
for the first reward structure is to place the decision threshold at 0.96.  In other 
words, given the reward structure, one will receive the highest rewards by 
waiting until there is only a 4% chance of being incorrect. 
 However, this optimal decision threshold changes with a limited 
memory. Instead of accumulating all the evidence, one can accumulate the last 
N samples, with expected reward curves also shown in Figure 1.   Of course, 
one can see that, since these sub-optimal models are receiving less information, 
their optimal scores go down with decreasing memory.  However, what is not 
intuitively obvious is that the optimal decision threshold also decreases with 
decreasing memory.   A convenient way to interpret this result is that the cost 
of the evidence becomes greater when the model uses less of it due to memory 
limitations.  
 In this task, it is reasonable to assume that human subjects do not have 
an infinite memory capacity.  Therefore, if one were to perform this 
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experiment, asking the question, "Do people place their decision threshold to 
maximize their rewards?" it is difficult to answer without also knowing their 
memory limitations.  That is why this dissertation uses a generalized model of 
theses cognitive limitations. Only by doing so is the issue of decision threshold 
placement addressed.  
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CHAPTER 3:  BACKGROUND 
3.1 A historical perspective 
 Researchers in psychology have long appreciated the question of 
humans' ability to adapt their decision threshold to environmental rewards 
(Grant & Irwin, 1957; Green & Swets, 1961). However, the concept of a 
decision threshold has not gained much attention because many advances in 
the field have demonstrated that such a concept is not necessarily appropriate.  
The largest of these has been the discovery of many specific heuristics 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Gigerenzer 1987). 
 Before this time, however, psychologists were optimistic about 
understanding decision thresholds and probabilistic reasoning in general. 
During the 1960's, there was a consensus that human behavior could be well-
characterized through slight modifications of normative models.  This view 
was exemplified by Peterson & Beach's "Man is an intuitive statistician" 
(1967).  This article reviewed a collection of studies where subjects completed 
a variety of textbook-type probabilistic reasoning tasks, and were asked to 
make educated guesses.  In each case, the normative model for a particular task 
was modified by a simple operator to explain human behavior.  For example, 
when subjects were asked to estimate variance of a sequence of numbers, the 
normative model, of course, was the actual variance.  Since variance is defined 
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as the average of the squared deviations from the mean, the modification for 
human behavior was to raise the deviations to a slightly different exponent 
(Beach & Scopp, 1957). In most of the experiments, subjects failed to deviate 
from a central tendency to fully incorporate new data.  Peterson & Beach 
concluded that this "conservatism" was enough to describe most of the 
differences between human and normative behavior.  
 In the case of the decision threshold studies of Swets & Green (Swets, 
et al., 1959; Swets & Green, 1961), two separate instances of conservatism 
were identified.  In Swets, et al., (1959), subjects were presented five separate 
sequences of auditory signals where a tone was presented within variable 
noise. The d', or discriminability index, of a single tone was supposed to rise as 
the square root of the number of presentations, assuming subjects were 
combining their single tone estimates optimally.  However, subjects’ d's rose 
more slowly, showing that subjects were integrating evidence across 
successive tones, but slightly less than optimally. In Swets & Green (1961) 
payoff matrices were introduced in a similar experiment, so that each 
additional tone had a fixed point cost, while the experimenter manipulated the 
amount of reward for correct answers.  Subjects were paid a bonus as a 
function of their overall score, and were thus given an incentive to find the 
balance of accuracy and observation cost that would achieve the highest 
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rewards.   Though Green & Swets did not compute an optimal model, they did 
find that subjects did behave in the qualitatively correct manner.    Specifically, 
as subjects were given more incentive to respond accurately relative to the 
observation cost, they chose to receive more observations and consequently 
their errors decreased.  Again, however, the amount of observations increased 
only slightly with large increases in incentive.  This failure to adequately 
respond to environmental conditions also was described as conservatism.  
 These two phenomena, sub-optimal integration and sub-optimal 
decision threshold placement, are now interpreted as distinct. While sub-
optimal integration can be defined with or without a reward structure, sub-
optimal threshold placement cannot. However, in Peterson & Beach (1967), 
they were both described under the conservatism label.  During the next 
decade, the tools for distinguishing these two components of conservatism 
were made by Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) hugely influential prospect 
theory.   In this case, the expected utility of a choice, defined as  
 
    U(x) = P(x)*R(x) 
 
is changed with two distinct nonlinear transfer functions, becoming… 
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   U(x) = w(P(x))*v(R(x)) 
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W in this case is a function describes people's tendency to overweigh the 
importance of rare events, and underweight the importance of common events.  
V is a function that describes people's relative more powerful aversion to 
losses than liking of gains of the same amount.  This function also shows that 
increases of either gains or losses become less important with higher overall 
values.  
 Prospect theory might seem like a valuable step towards addressing the 
issue of decision threshold placement.  Again, the normative model of 
expected value was being modified, this time more systematically than in the 
Figure 5: Prospect Theory: (left) subjective probability assessment 
showing the bias of encoded probabilities (blue) toward overvaluing 
and undervaluing of likely events (right) subjective value function 
showing the relative higher subjective value of losses (slope of the 
curve at the lower right quadrant) than  gains (upper right quadrant).  
Also, the slope of both losses and gains decays with greater objective 
value.  
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research of the previous decade.  It would seem that an accurate model of 
human behavior could be met by finding specific parameters for the transfer 
functions. The problem was that Kahneman & Tversky also came up with a 
veritable mountain of instances, such as framing effects, and base-rate neglect, 
where normative models failed. Moreover, the overall focus of research began 
to abandon normative models entirely.  Instead, Kahneman & Tversky were 
able to identify more simple heuristics that matched subjects' behavior.  Thus, 
from this perspective, the very concept of a decision threshold seems irrelevant 
if one can find the specific heuristic for a particular task. Because of this, the 
initial optimism of the 1960's, which neatly explained probabilistic decision 
placement by changing a normative model, began to die out in the early 1980s.   
 In the early 1980's, the prevailing view of probabilistic reasoning was 
that decision thresholds were not a valid research endeavor.  As expressed 
previously, there were two basic reasons for this skepticism: the problem of 
heuristics and an unknown integration process.    At this point, I would like to 
discuss each of the concerns, and explain how research has addressed these 
concerns in the intervening years.   
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3.2 Heuristics vs. Normative Models 
 As stated before, the work of Kahneman & Tversky in the late 1970's 
was greatly influential in dissuading the field in the use of normative models to 
describe decision thresholds in favor of a heuristic approach.  An example of a 
common heuristic identified by Kahneman & Tversky was "anchoring and 
adjustment" where subjects adjust their measurement from a common value 
(the "anchor") to make an estimate of some unknown quantity.  Kahneman & 
Tversky were able to illustrate this by giving them this "anchor" (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  For example, subjects were asked to guess the percentage 
of African nations that were part of the United Nations.  However, before each 
guess, they were also asked guess whether this same percentage was above or 
below a random variable.  They found that when the random value was 10, the 
median guess was 25, but when the random variable was 65, the median guess 
was 45.  This result clearly illustrates a case for deliberate heuristic, instead of 
a holistic integration of information. If people commonly use heuristics in 
sequential probabilistic reasoning, the concept of a decision threshold does not 
seem to be generalizable to more than a specific task.   
 However, it was not long until studies were again finding cases in 
which normative models could be a realistic behavioral model. In an 
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experiment by Gluck & Bower (1988) subjects were given records of patients 
who could display a combination one to four symptoms, (bloody nose, cramps, 
etc.), each possible symptoms for two hypothetical diseases.  Instead of being 
presented with the probabilities of the events, subjects were presented with 
successive records of particular patients, showing each time a particular 
combination of symptoms.  Subjects then guessed which disease, and they 
were given feedback.  Thus, they were presented with the probabilities 
implicitly in the frequency of each combination of symptoms with the 
particular disease. Gluck & Bower found that subjects chose each disease 
according the true probabilities, accounting for not just the evidence provided 
by the symptoms, but for different base rate probabilities.   This experiment 
provided a sharp counter-example to the heuristic approach, suggesting that 
probabilities learned through experience, rather than description, removes 
many of the heuristics and biases discovered by Kahneman & Tversky.  
 A popular article highlighting the difference in description and 
experience tasks is Hertwig, et al. (2004).   In this study, subjects were given 
the same task under two different information conditions, based on description 
or experience, with identical probabilities and payoffs.  The task was to choose 
between two options, each with a payoff (sometimes negative) and a certain 
risk of getting a zero payoff.  For example, one decision problem (out of 6) 
21 
was to choose between a payoff of 4 with a probability of 0.8 and payoff of 3 
with a probability of 1.   The converse outcome of each choice had the inverse 
probability, 0.2 and 0; respectively both had the payoff of 0.   The difference 
was in how subjects received the information about the probabilities and 
payoffs by either an explicit description or by experiencing the reward 
structure through repeated trials.  These two conditions led to opposite 
weightings of rare events.  The “description” group tended to overweight rare 
events, while the “experience” group tended to underweight the rare events. 
For example, the percentage of subjects choosing the better choice (higher 
expected value of 4x0.8+ 0*0.2 = 3.2) in each condition was 36 and 88, for the 
description and experience group, respectively.  This significant difference (p 
=<0.0001) is hypothesized to be due to people’s underweighting of the 
likelihood of the rare zero payoff.   Furthermore, it reiterates the hypothesis 
that implicit experiential learning of probabilities is the key to accurate 
processing of probabilities.  
 Though this concept seems to have had some traction in the 
psychological community, it is not without controversy.  Fox and Hadar (2004) 
assert that the differences between the two conditions are entirely due to a 
statistical, not psychological, phenomenon.   Subjects in the experience 
condition run the risk of never seeing the rare event, especially when the 
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probability is less than 0.1.  If so, subjects are underweighting it simply 
because they think it does not exist.   Fox and Hadar compute the likelihood of 
this happening, and the resulting distortion of the results, which predict the 
effects shown in Hertwig, et al. (2004). Nevertheless, similar results have been 
shown in Gottlieb (2007) & Lee (2006).  In Lee (2004), subjects were given 
advice in a sequential decision making task where “advisors” gave 
recommendations with an objective probability (60%, 70%, 80%) that the 
subject was aware of.   Though the subject's choice coincided with the advice, 
the subject's confidence did not increase solely with the probability.  Instead, it 
varied both with the probability and the frequency of the advice, and actually 
was less for rare but sure advice than for frequent, but less reliable advice.   
 Though the way probabilities are encoded contributes to the level of 
processing, it is not the only determinant.  The distinction of experiential and 
descriptive encoding of probabilities is related to a larger difference between 
implicit and explicit processing of probabilistic information.  According to this 
dual-process theory, two different processing systems are available to people 
when processing probabilistic or categorical information.  The explicit system, 
unique to humans, is thought to be the symbolic, verbalizable processing that 
uses our forebrain.  The implicit system is the older system that we share with 
other animals.  Theoretically, this implicit system learns without conscious 
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attention or use of working memory (Squire, 1992).  Later theories by Squire 
blur this implicit/explicit distinction by showing that many tasks activate brain 
areas associated with both systems.  Furthermore, his theories draw more 
distinctions, including between semantic and episodic memory, priming, and 
conditioning.  
 Though the multiple memory systems that have been hypothesized have yet to 
be clearly defined, a categorization experiment by Ashby & Waldron (1999) 
shows how changes in the task can greatly influence the type of processing 
done on probabilistic data.  In this experiment, subjects were shown a two 
dimensional stimulus, a bar on the screen that could vary in both length and 
orientation.  They learned to categorize each stimulus as either A or B through 
feedback. The experiment consisted of two conditions, each designed to 
provoke either explicit or implicit categorization of the stimulus.  In one 
condition, the rule between A and B existed along one of the two stimulus 
dimensions, with the other being irrelevant.  In the other condition, the correct 
division between A and B existed across the two dimensions.  In the first 
condition, subjects searched for an explicit, verbalizable rule, which eventually 
led to perfect categorization. In the other condition, since no such rule was 
easily verbalizable, people could not "figure out" a way to solve the problem. 
24 
However, people did improve, slowly learning to perform better, but could not 
explain the cause of their improvement.   
 A thorough treatment of the field of the different kinds of memory and 
probabilistic reasoning are outside the scope of this dissertation.   However, the 
research outlined above illustrates a valid concern that the concept of a 
decision threshold may not be appropriate depending on how the task is 
designed.  Whether or not subjects use heuristics in a task has been shown to 
be highly dependent on the task details.  Thus, in the next section we will 
discuss motivations behind the design of our task, and discuss the results of 
experiments with related tasks.  
 
 
3.3 A question of task 
 As noted above, our goal of studying decision thresholds in a 
reasonable way relies on the precise design of our task. Though we do not need 
subjects to access specific implicit reasoning brain areas, a design principle of 
our task should avoid subjects using some specific heuristics. For this reason 
and the research presented above, our task should be designed so that subjects 
should learn base probabilities through experience and present a task that is not 
solved by an easily verbalizable rule.  However, for the sake of expediency, 
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our initial experiment shall bypass learning probabilities through experience, 
and instead try to present probabilistic evidence in a non-verbal way.  In each 
trial, the subject received samples from one of two overlapping distributions 
(Figure 6).  After each sample, the subject had three choices: to choose the left 
distribution, the right distribution, or to choose another sample.  Each sample 
would cost a number of points, dependent upon whether the subjects were in 
the high or low threshold reward condition.  In the high reward condition, 
samples cost 1 point, while in the low condition, samples costs 4 points. 
Correct distribution choices had a reward of 10 points for the high threshold 
condition, and 99 points for the low threshold condition.  Incorrect distribution 
choices had a cost of 100 points in the high reward condition and 99 points in 
the low reward condition, subjects started with 0 points, and were shown the 
number of points in a bar graph on the right hand side of the screen, and above 
the two distributions.   
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 Hopefully, it is easy to see that the main objectives of the experimental 
design are met with this task.  At multiple stages during each trial, subjects 
weigh the cost of new information against the current evidence.  When they 
make the decision to end the trial by making a decision to choose either 
distribution, they usually do so with remaining uncertainty.   As they go 
Figure 6: Screenshot: A trial in progress is shown, with the two 
overlapping distributions shown in blue.  Samples were marked with a 
large asterisk.  Above, the trial number and current score is shown and 
updated after each sample purchase and at the end of the trial.  The 
cumulative score is shown as a bar graph on the right.  The axis of the 
bar graph increased or decreased by 1000 when the subject's score 
increased beyond the current limits.  
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through multiple trials, they are motivated to find the level of skepticism that 
generates the correct number of points.  
 A valid concern in using a new task is that subjects do not behave in the 
way that the experimenters intend.  Though the task in this dissertation is new, 
it is related to two others that have been studied rigorously.  I would like to 
present these two related tasks and results from their experiments.  However, 
as with any new task, the true demonstration that subjects are behaving 
properly is with the results of an initial experiment.   Nevertheless, these 
experiments show conflicting results and the cause of this difference deserves 
to be explored.  
 In the first related task, called the “weather prediction task,” it is not 
clear that subjects will easily integrate information from multiple sources.  
Although it was originally touted as an ideal task for implicit integration 
(Knowlton, et al., 1994), this assertion remains controversial.   Subjects are 
presented with four cards, with squares, diamonds, circles, or triangles.  Each 
card can be placed face up or down in a random order.  Each card face 
represents a conditional probability, with its absence representing the inverse.  
Only fourteen combinations were presented, and subjects saw all cards 
simultaneously.  Gluck, et al. (2002), showed that in the original version of this 
task, 90% of subjects’ actions were best described as a singleton strategy, i.e., 
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learning the proper response for single cards while guessing randomly for the 
others.   Furthermore, in the final block of cues, only 30% of cues were best fit 
by a multi-cue strategy. Gluck, et al. (2002) argue that subjects choose this 
strategy because they can choose correctly (with higher card-indicated 
probability) 75% of the time with a singleton strategy.   Thus, from this 
research it is not clear if subjects are not integrating probabilistic information 
because they do not have the cognitive ability, or simply are not properly 
motivated.  
  A recent experiment with a closely-related task refutes the theory that 
subjects cannot integrate probabilistic information across sources.  Yang & 
Shadlen (2007) showed that monkeys can combine four sequential symbolic 
cues of probabilistic evidence when making a two-alternative forced choice 
task.  In their study, two monkeys were trained on ten possible cues, 
representing a range of evidence between total certainties in either of two 
options.   When four cues were presented in half-second intervals, the 
monkeys’ probability matched their responses proportionally to the summed 
log of the likelihood ratio (logLR) of each cue.  Moreover, the neural recording 
of their lateral intraparietal area (LIP) showed a correlation between the 
summed logLR and spike rate after each cue.  This would seem to suggest that 
subjects in our task maybe able to integrate the probabilistic information across 
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each sequential cue.  While drawing precise conclusions from experiments 
from another species may be unwise, it showed that the primate brain was 
certainly capable of holistic information integration.   
 
  However, the subjects in this experiment were not forced to ‘buy’ each 
sample, and always had four.  In my task, the subjects had an additional 
problem of evaluating the amount of evidence after every sample, and had a 
range of samples for every trial much higher than four, with trials commonly 
having as many as eight, ten, or fifteen samples.  Nevertheless, this research is 
important because it shows that primates can integrate probabilistic 
information in a relatively unbiased way.  Though this experiment was done in 
primates, it is unlikely that humans would completely lack the ability so clearly 
shown in monkeys.  
 The issue of what neural processes and/or strategies are used in the 
weather prediction task is still ongoing (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Newell & 
Shanks, 2006).   However, it is unclear whether this controversy directly 
speaks to the task presented in this paper. The differences between different 
versions of the weather prediction task and the one in this paper may be 
substantial enough for the arguments to be not entirely relevant.  These 
differences, such as the intuitive understanding of the nature of the task, and 
30 
the fact that the range of evidence varies continuously, both undermine the 
arguments that subjects may be looking for a single cue, or that subjects are 
memorizing specific patterns.  The fact that the monkeys in Yang & Shadlen 
2007 were able to modulate their responses proportionally to the summed 
logLR of the response further suggests that the differences in this task and the 
more traditional versions of the weather prediction task will be significant.   
However, as we describe later, the framework for analyzing subjects’ data is 
rich enough so that singleton or single cue strategies will readily become 
apparent.  
 
 
Figure 7: Expected Reward Functions; The expected rewards of the 
high and low threshold condition are shown as a function of a cut-off 
decision threshold of the cumulative posterior probability of samples.   
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3.4 Can people adapt to different reward structures? 
 Of course, there also exists the possibility that subjects do not have a 
threshold because they are not capable of adapting their behavior to a specific 
reward structure.   It is well known that in many two-alternative forced choice 
tasks, subjects do not converge to optimal behavior, instead probability 
matching across the alternatives (see Shanks, et al., 2002) .  For example, in a 
signal detection task used by Kubovy & Healy (1981), subjects closely 
probability match despite clear changes in the reward structure.  Subjects were 
given the task of choosing whether a particular height belonged to a man or a 
woman.  Only small modifications to the decision rule were made when 
subjects were given twice as much money when choosing men correctly, and 
vice versa.  This effect was also seen when subjects were told that men’s' 
heights would be given twice as often.  Thus, a concern for the current task is 
that subjects will never learn to approach optimal behavior.  
 Though probability matching is a well-researched phenomenon, there 
has been some evidence it can be avoided if experimenters take the proper 
precautions.  In Shanks and Newell (2002), subjects were shown to stay away 
from probability matching in tasks where probability matching behavior was 
commonly found in the face of a higher reward.  According to Shanks and 
Newell, subjects will tend towards optimal behavior if three factors are met.  
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First, subjects need to be given large financial incentives.  In our task, subjects 
can make up to $300 over 6 hours if they perform close to ideal behavior.  
Second, subjects should be given meaningful feedback.  In our task, in addition 
to the traditional "kaching" and "buzz" sounds for correct/incorrect answers, 
they can track their decision performance by watching their wealth accumulate 
as a bar graph to the right of the screen.  Third, subjects say they should have 
extensive training.  In our task, subjects ran in 1500 trials, in each condition.  
 To investigate whether subjects can adapt to their decision threshold to 
different reward structures, I varied the reward structure: the cost of correct 
answers along with the cost of each sample.  There were two conditions, in 
which the ideal behavior was to have either a low or high decision threshold, 
i.e. being right about a decision either 82% (low) or 96% (high) of the time.  
As one can see in Figure 7, one will perform substantially worse if one chooses 
one threshold vs. two (12pts/trial vs. 17pts/trial).  So, comparing subjects' 
performance across conditions will test whether people make their decisions 
based upon the right amount of information according the reward structure in 
each condition.   
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3.5 Limitations of Normative Models 
 So far I have argued that modified normative models have a place in 
decision making research, despite the existence of heuristics.  Both Busemeyer 
& Rappoport (1988) and Myung & Busemeyer used a sequential probabilistic 
reasoning task where subjects are asked to diagnose one of two diseases. They 
could ask for a diagnostic test, in which they would be told the results and the 
probability of the test being correct.  Seven psychological models were 
evaluated, including the optimal stopping rule, fixed sampling, random walk, 
fixed forgetting, horse race or accumulator, runs, and hybrid stopping rules. 
The most promising psychological model was a myopic stopping rule, which 
prescribed purchasing observations until the expected loss of making a 
diagnosis after purchasing n tests was less than cost of the test observations.   
However, the authors expressed concern of the validity of this model, because, 
though it fit better than others, it did not explain more than 40% of the data.   
Especially vexing to the authors were the instances in which subjects would 
choose to perform a diagnostic test, and then would diagnose the opposite 
disease.  
 The next year, in Myung & Busemeyer (1989), subjects performed the 
same medical decision making task where subjects ran tests to differentially 
diagnose a patient with one of two diseases. They ran a number of these tests 
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under two different reward structures.  If the subjects were right, they received 
nothing. But if they were wrong, subjects were charged $0.25 or $0.20 
(starting with $10).  The test correctly indicated the disease 65% of the time, 
and cost either 1/3 o 1/4 of a cent.  The ideal behavior in the two conditions 
was to wait until the difference between diagnoses for each disease was either 
three or four tests, depending on condition.  Over the course of 450 trials, 
subjects successfully learned to perform enough tests until this decision 
threshold was reached.  However, their asymptotic behavior chose slightly less 
than the right amount of information in each case. 
 These two papers show an instance of a researcher first trying to find a 
specific heuristic for a probabilistic reasoning task, and then abandoning this 
method for one that uses normative rules.  Though the later paper also makes 
an argument about how subjects learn, even without this analysis, one can 
draw more conclusions by simply comparing to subjects behavior to the ideal.   
Subjects eventually learned to approximate ideal behavior, necessitating using 
nearly all of the acquired information.  Furthermore, since the subjects were 
paid, they were motivated to find the optimal behavior for a particular reward 
structure, and were able to adapt when that reward structure changed.  
 To summarize this chapter, I first showed that, historically, the concept 
of a decision threshold may not be popular due to the use of heuristics for 
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many probabilistic tasks. However, subsequent research suggested an 
appropriate context for this research: short probabilistic decisions where 
heuristics are not easily accessible. I explored the distinctions between 
sequential probabilistic reasoning tasks that encouraged heuristic reasoning 
and those that illicited a more heuristic approach. I used those distinctions to 
motivate the specific design of the current task. Specifically, the task presents 
uncertain evidence sequentially, requiring the subject to evaluate whether they 
have enough information to make the decision in light of a clearly defined 
reward structure. Subjects are motivated to find an optimal balance between 
random guessing and indecisiveness but cannot necessarily use a sufficing 
heuristic to adequately perform the task.  I then discussed the relative merit of 
optimal and heuristic models, using the example of a researcher (Busemeyer) 
who used both approaches to study the same task.  
 This chapter was not designed to convince the reader that the task 
succeeded in avoiding heuristic approaches to a sequential decision task.  
Instead, it was to demonstrate that the history of this conflict between the two 
approaches has not indicated a clear advantage to either side.  As in many other 
studies of cognition, it may be reasonable to assume that subjects can be 
sufficiently manipulated into either approach, and that there is some level of 
processing with both approaches.  However, this particular task, by avoiding 
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verbal descriptions and easily applicable rules, tries to minimize the benefit of 
a heuristic approach.  Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that this 
experiment tests both the subject's ability to reason without heuristics, and also 
their ability to recognize that such an approach may not be useful.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
  
CHAPTER 4:  Modeling Cognitive Limitations 
 Before we build a model of subject behavior, we must describe a model 
of ideal behavior, which will act as our template.   The very concept of a 
decision threshold implies that subjects accumulate evidence across sequential 
samples.   To accumulate subjects’ evidence, we expressed the relative 
evidence for one distribution as the logLR (figure 8, left).  This method is a 
version of the sequential probability ratio test (see Swets & Green 1966 or 
Gold & Shadlen, 2002).  The ideal observer expresses evidence as the log of 
the ratio of the probability distributions or 
     
    
 
where si denotes the ith sample of each trial.  
 Evidence can be accumulated by summing the evidence from each 
sample1, starting with an initial evidence of 0.  
 
                                                 
1 Equivalently, evidence could be expressed as probabilities and updated through Bayes’ Rule.  
However, I prefer to use this because the evidence is linear function and the evidence can be 
updated by a simple sum. 
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Figure 8 (right) shows a plot of the accumulated evidence for all trials for one 
subject in one condition, a total of 750 trials. Each observation is marked as 
one of three possible actions: a declaration for the left distribution (green), a 
declaration for the right distribution (red), and a choice of another sample 
(blue).  In this graph, one can see some sort of a threshold, albeit a noisy one.  
In an ideal model, the blue sample points would be completely separated from 
Figure 8:  (left) accumulated evidence of two trials, expressed in 
logLR.   In one trial, the subject chooses the left distribution after three 
samples (red). In the other trial, the subject chooses the right 
distribution after five samples.  Note that this begins with two samples 
equally likely to be from either distribution.  (Right) accumulated 
evidence for 750 trials, expressed in logLR. All left declarations are 
shown in red. All right declarations are shown in green.  All additional 
samples are shown in blue. 
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the green and red declaration points.  However, one can see that the overlap of 
the points in actual data will demand that one must accommodate noise.   
 
 To provide a framework for introducing cognitive limitations, I also 
will describe a "black-box" model of the sequential decision making (figure 9). 
This model is not really very descriptive, because it is designed in a “truistic” 
fashion, only making assertions that are self-evident.  For example, one can say 
that the inputs to the system are visual stimuli that represent some amount of 
probabilistic evidence, and that the subject transduces the true probabilistic 
evidence into some other internal evidence or confidence.  The transfer 
function between the true evidence and the internal confidence may be a 
simple proportion or highly dependent on a multitude of variables.  At this 
point, my only assertion is that such a function actually exists.  Similarly, one 
Actual  
Evidence/ 
Physical 
Stimulus 
Observation Integration
Memory/Belief
Decision/ 
Threshold 
Sequential 
Effects  
Observed 
Evidence 
choice
Figure 9:  General model of sequential decision making.  Physical evidence 
is translated into an internal representation of evidence through observation.  
This evidence is integrated into some previous belief about either 
distribution.   Using this overall belief, the subject uses some decision 
process or threshold to make a distribution choice. This model is designed to 
help discriminate between sources of noise and/or bias.  I acknowledge that 
sequential effects (in red), changes in the observational bias due to past 
events, may occur.  However, these are treated as noise in this model.  
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can argue that observed evidence is somehow integrated into some prior belief 
about which distribution is the originator of the samples.  
  This integration may be perfect or completely leaky, with the current 
observed evidence simply replacing any existing belief.   Finally, some kind of 
rule or threshold is used to make the decision on the current relative confidence 
about either distribution, which produces the choice of either to declare either 
distribution or to get another sample.  
 The black box model outline above is designed simply to divide the 
overall process of sequential decision making simpler components.  In the next 
four sections, I will outline the specific assumptions I make about each 
process.  
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Figure 10:  Observation Noise Noise is hypothesized to influence each 
translation of the physical stimulus into an internal representation of 
evidence.  The model assumes this noise to be Gaussian and unbiased.  
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4.1 Observation  
 Though the task interface was designed to minimize error in receiving 
probabilistic evidence, it is highly probable that there are significant 
differences that affect behavior.  This behavior can be divided into a systematic 
bias, including both non-linear and linear components, and variation is non-
systematic and simply varies on each individual case.  I make the assumption 
that the systematic bias can be described as proportional to the actual evidence.  
This assumption is reasonable for a couple of reasons.  First, it was clear to all 
participants that a sample that was in the exact middle of the screen provided 
no relative evidence.  Thus, this point of the transfer function matches the 
actual evidence at the origin.  Second, the vast majority of the samples are 
going to be close to the zero point, with very few samples being extreme in 
either direction.  The linear translation of physical evidence to confidence is 
primarily a local assumption about this origin.  Nevertheless, the non-
systematic variation will need to be represented.  I will choose to do so as an 
unbiased normal distribution added to every sample (figure 10).  
  
    
  
 
42 
4.2 Integration  
 As I have noted in Chapter 3, Yang and Shadlen (2007) have suggested 
that LIP activity reflects perfect integration of probabilistic evidence. On the 
other hand, in other similar tasks, Gluck, et, al. (2002) have shown that people 
use a singleton (memoryless) strategy, where the evidence from each sample 
simply replaces the current belief.  For this reason, we will introduce a single 
parameter model of exponential memory decay that can support various 
degrees of loss from total loss to perfect memory.   This decision was also 
guided by an initial nonparametric study (see Appendix).   This "leaky 
accumulator" hypothesis has been suggested previously (Smith, 1995; Usher 
and McClelland, 2001; Busemeyer et al., 2006) and is widely used in current 
models of belief updating (Rao, 2007), The basic prediction of this hypothesis 
is that the information acquired later in a trial should exert a larger influence on 
the subject's choice than the information acquired earlier, which has "leaked" 
away by the time the decision is rendered. Thus leaky integration explains the 
diminishing amount of evidence accumulated in longer trials, because some 
information at the beginning of the trial is partially lost.   
 A variety of mechanisms could be responsible for this loss.  For 
example, probabilistic evidence could not be integrated completely. Instead 
each individual piece of evidence could be in a cue that gets integrated each 
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time.  Items in this cue could "fall out" probabilistically. Alternatively, a true 
average could be computed, but this average would have a tendency to decay 
over time, tending towards a prior of equal likelihood between the two 
distributions.  I make no specific claims. However, it seems intuitive that, 
especially in trials that are over 15 samples long, some of the information is 
being lost.   
The observed evidence (OE) was defined as:  
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 where "n-i" denotes an exponent.  
 The term w  generally varies for subjects between 1 and 1.5.  This form 
of the leaky integrator was used so that reasonable values of w  could account 
for all ranges of memory, from perfect integration ( w  = 1) to nearly 
memoryless ( w >1.7).   
 It is important to note that a leaky integrator necessarily posits a 
difference between the evidence given to the subject and the evidence used by 
the subject.   While a subject with limited memory may have a constant 
threshold of accumulated internal evidence, the actual amount of evidence 
required to reach this threshold may increase due to the increasing loss of 
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longer trials.  Thus, the internal decision threshold and the observed, external 
threshold may be different.  This distinction will be demonstrated in Chapter 6.   
 
4.3 Decision Threshold  
 The previous arguments of Chapter 3 have shown that it is not an 
unreasonable estimate of human behavior. However, though assuming a 
threshold exists that will remain trial to trial does not mean that it will remain 
constant within the trial.  Intuitively, it seems likely that subjects may feel an 
increased pressure to declare a distribution as time goes on.  Thus, subjects 
may lower their threshold with increasing trials. Thus, it may be reasonable to 
model this decrease with a linear function:  
 
slopeStarti ThiThTh *+=  
 
 A sloping threshold has successfully modeled behavior in other 
sequential choice tasks.  For example Saad & Russo (2007) show that in a task 
where people evaluate two alternatives (rented apartments), people have a 
fixed number of attributes that they are willing to recognize as relevant. The 
effect of this fixing of criteria effectively creates a decreasing criterion as 
subjects accumulate information.    
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 Though it is clear that, by itself, a non-zero slope threshold represents a 
deviation from optimal behavior, it is not clear in the context of other cognitive 
limitations.  For example, in the last section, it was noted that positing a "leaky 
integrator" causes the observed threshold of a model to increase while the 
internal threshold remains constant.  Thus, it may actually be optimal for the 
subject to deliberately decrease the threshold to offset the effect of the leaky 
integration.  This interaction between these two parameters is further explored 
in chapter 6 & 7.  
 
4.4 Threshold Noise 
 It is clear from Figure 8 (right) from subjects' data that a strict linear 
threshold that is not dependent on any other variables may not accurately 
model subjects' behavior.  Subjects may be varying their threshold from trial to 
trial for a number of reasons, including attentional differences and transitional 
effects of recent losses or gains.   The overall purpose of this model is not to 
explore all of those reasons.  Instead, it is to isolate the consistency of a 
threshold apart from these considerations.  Thus, we will treat these variations 
as noise.  Threshold noise has been included in other models (Luce 1977; 
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1988).   
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 The total noise of the model associated with each observation is the 
sum of the observational and the threshold noise components.  However, since 
the evidence is incompletely integrated (due to leak), the observational noise is 
muted by the leaky integrated terms.  The expression for the total noise TN is 
as follows: 
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where ThN  is the threshold noise, oN is the noise associated with each 
observation.  
 All the parameter values oN ThN w slopeStarti ThTh , were found using a 
maximum likelihood approach.  Since total noise is assumed to be normally 
distributed, the overall probability function for a threshold was defined as a 
cumulative normal distribution ),,( 2σμxΦ , were x is the x is the observed 
evidence OE, mu is the threshold function Th, and the variance is the total 
noise TN.  Thus, the probability of a declaration of the "right" distribution was 
defined as:  
 
),,()|( TNThOEOEdeclareP rightrightright Φ=  
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where rightOE is the evidence of observations where subject ended each trial by 
choosing the right distribution. The probability for the left distribution uses the 
threshold on the opposite side, becoming:  
 
),,()|( TNThOEOEdeclareP leftleftleft −Φ=  
 
If the neither distributions were declared, than subject must have chosen an 
additional sample, thereby defining the probability as:  
 
),,(),,(1)|( TNThOETNThOEOEsampleP samplerightsample −Φ−Φ−=  
 
 The five parameters oN ThN w slopeStarti ThTh  that maximized the 
probability of each subject’s data were determined through a gradient descent 
method.  As a test of the method and implementation, multiple sessions of 750 
trials were generated using a model with arbitrary known parameters.   The 
maximum likelihood fit returned the input values within 1%.  
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CHAPTER 5:  ANALYSIS SCHEME 
 This chapter describes the analysis scheme by which I quantify the 
general trends of subject behavior, and provide criteria with which to compare 
this behavior with that of the model.   For example, when looking at Figure 11 
below left (actual subject data) one can see the subject's decisions to declare 
either distribution (red & green dots) generally decrease in log-odds (y-axis) 
with increasing number of samples (x-axis).  The analysis scheme simply 
quantifies these overall trends, generating six parameters representing the 
Figure 11: Analysis Scheme: (Left) Cumulative log-odds values of samples 
(blue) and declarations of left and right distributions as the source of the 
samples (green and red, respectively). These values are plotted against the 
order of each sample (x-axis). (Right) A template is to be applied to each 
sample interval, consisting of a threshold and noise parameter.  Red, blue, 
and green curves represent the probability distributions defined by the model 
for each decision.  Since this template is applied at each interval (25 intervals 
x 2 (threshold + noise) = 50 parameters.  Later, regressions are taken of these 
50 values to define overall trends.  
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linear trend of the threshold (two parameters), the linear trend of the noise (two 
parameters), and the average score, and the average number of samples (each 1 
parameter).  These values generated by the analysis scheme have a direct 
relationship with the model parameters, but are not identical.  In fact, one can 
see that from figure 12 that subjects don't necessarily exhibit external linear 
threshold trends (middle left).  It is not critical for either the model or the 
subject to have exact linear trends.  Instead, these statistics are only found to 
show that the general trends are similar between the subject and the model.   
 These threshold and noise trends are extracted by applying a threshold 
and noise template on each trial interval (figure 11 right).  In other words, I 
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Figure 12: Linear Trends: (far left) Histogram in the same format of 
figure 11 (above left) Blue points shows threshold values for each 
sample interval, linear trend is shown in red. (above right) Blue points 
shows Noise values for each sample interval, linear trend is shown in 
red. (far right) Histogram of samples intervals is shown in blue. An 
exponential trend is shown in red.  The linear trends for threshold and 
noise plus the histogram exponential and average score represent our 
descriptive variables.  
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assign a probability to each decision by defining a decision threshold, and 
assuming that this threshold is stochastic. As this is part of a descriptive 
analysis, I do not make an assumption about this noise or the nature of noise 
around the threshold.  Given that we have included noise in our model, our 
threshold is now probabilistic, and we can define that probability of crossing 
this threshold (and therefore making a decision) as:  
 
 
 
Since we are also defining two thresholds, we can also define the right 
threshold in the same way. 
 
  
 
Of course, the decision to take another sample happens when neither threshold 
is reached, and can be defined as:  
 
  
 
51 
I used maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate Th, S.   That is, we 
will have the U & S that will maximize the likelihood of our particular data set.  
The linear trends are found by applying a regression the noise and threshold 
parameters (figure 12).  However, since these parameters represent a widely 
varying amount of data, this regression is weighted by the number of samples 
at each interval.  
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CHAPTER 6:  RESULTS 
 As there are many novel parts to this research, including a task, model, 
and analysis scheme, I will begin with an overview of subjects' behavior, 
showing that subjects could complete the task with a reasonable efficiency.   
Six subjects ran in two sessions of trials, one session in each condition (high 
and low ideal threshold), with 1500 trials per session.  The order of these 
Figure 13: (top left) Sample histogram of 750 trials of the ideal observer in the 
high threshold condition (top right) Sample histogram of the ideal observer in 
the low threshold condition. Rows show histograms for each subject.
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Subject 1
C
on
di
tio
n 
1:
 S
am
pl
es
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
C
on
di
tio
n 
2:
 S
am
pl
es
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Subject 2
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Subject 3
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Subject 4
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Subject 5
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Subject 6
0 10 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
C
on
di
tio
n 
1:
 S
am
pl
es
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
50
100
150
200
250
Sample Order
C
on
di
tio
n 
2:
 S
am
pl
es
53 
sessions was counterbalanced across subjects to eliminate performance effects.  
As described above, subjects were paid $0.01 per point, with a free gift of 
$0.10 and $0.25 per trial, leading to the possibility of earning roughly $255 if 
the subject performed ideally.  
 An informative initial graph are the histograms of the samples per trial 
(Figure 12, above).  One can see that, in a general sense each subject's 
distribution varies only slightly from that of the ideal observer (top left).  Each 
subject has a gradually decaying number of samples, and this decay is 
generally shorter for the low threshold condition.    
 However, there is a noticeable amount of variation within each 
condition, especially for the high thresholds.  It is clear that both the second 
subject and the fourth subject, while abstaining from declarations for the first 
two samples, make decision often after the third trial, much more than the ideal 
observer in this case. For this reason, it was hypothesized that subjects may be 
quickly choosing three samples, integrating the evidence, but not evaluating 
whether the total evidence was enough to make a choice until after the third or 
fourth sample.  This may have become habit for some since it is relatively rare 
for a subject to declare after two samples, even for the ideal observer. An 
appropriate metric to provide evidence for an "initial skepticism" was never 
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found.  Thus, it may be useful for future investigations to incorporate such a 
metric.  
   
6.1 Approximation of Behavior 
 A comparison between model and behavior outputs on the six analytic 
variables (figure 14) is informative in two ways.  First, one can evaluate the 
ability of the model to capture subjects’ behavior.  Second, one can evaluate 
subjects overall performance in the task, and whether or not subjects were able 
to adapt to the different conditions.  Figure 14 shows the model was able to 
capture each subject's performance and general behavioral trends and most 
importantly, the two decision threshold variables, the slope and starting value.  
However, since the average score (bottom graph) for the model is consistently 
higher than each subjects, one can say that the model slightly over-estimates 
subjects’ scores.  However, it is likely that much of this difference in average 
score is due to sensitivity a small number of errors.  Even though the average is 
over a large number of trials (750), a few lapses of attention, leading to random 
guessing, would explain a change in score, while other parameters would not 
be affected.  This sensitivity would not be as strong in the low threshold 
condition since subjects generally have smaller numbers of trials, causing less 
lapses of attention and generally accepting a higher level of errors.  
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 One can see, initially, that people perform substantially less than 
optimally, although with a high variance.  Subjects averaged about 4.5 points 
per trial in the high condition, and 1.5 points per trial in the low condition.   
However, one can bring perspective to these numbers by comparing the 
performance of memory-limited ideal observers (Figure 4).   For example, a 1-
step memory, an ideal observer that makes the correct decision when the 
current sample (left/right distance) is greater than 1.72, only averages 1.2 
points per trial for the high condition, and 3.8 points for the low condition, 
while an observer with a 3-step memory, or when the logLR sum of the last 3 
samples is greater than 2.75 (p = 0.94), can only achieve 6.8 points per trial 
(high) and 6.5 points per trial (low).   
 One might be tempted to approximate subjects’ memory this way, but 
these numbers would be spurious, since another possibility is that subjects 
could have perfect memory, but a biased threshold.  For example, as one can 
see in Figure 7, an observer would lose 5 points per trial by setting the decision 
threshold at 0.85 instead of 0.95. Nevertheless, one can argue from Figure 1 
that it is likely that some integration is going on, and that subjects’ decision 
thresholds are necessarily approximate to ideal levels.   
 The question of whether or not subjects can adapt to the reward 
structure is loosely answered in the graphs of the histogram fits.  It is clear that 
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subjects are changing the overall distribution appropriately, choosing more 
samples in the higher threshold condition.  This conclusion is further supported 
by the threshold estimates themselves, which also vary around the ideals.  
However, it is important to note that these are just the observed thresholds, not 
an estimate of the internal thresholds, which will be described in the next 
section.   
 The noise parameters (slope and start) are fairly small, which gives 
confidence to the assertion that a consistently linear threshold actually exists.  
One may be tempted to interpret the relative level of slope and starting value as 
relative evidence for primarily observation or threshold noise.  However, since 
these terms are directly modeled parameters, a stronger argument can be made 
about them in the next section. 
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Figure 14: (Left Column) Subject fits in the high threshold condition. 
(Right Column) Fits for the low threshold condition: dotted lines show 
ideal values for each variable. Green = observed model values, red = 
subject values, blue = bootstrapped confidence intervals, generated by 
sampling 750 trials with replacement, green error bars = confidence 
intervals generated by runs of the model with each subject’s individual 
parameters 
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6.2   Model Parameters 
 The first conclusion that can be made from an examination of the fitted 
model parameters is that observational noise had little descriptive value. The 
actual fits yielded negligible values, less than a tenth of a log-odds unit, so they 
were eliminated from the model. This means that the amount of variation from 
a strict threshold, seen in Figures 11 and 12, can adequately be described by a 
threshold noise term and integrative leak.  Since the threshold noise term only 
introduces noise that appears equally across all sample intervals, any increase 
in noise should be explained by the integrative leak term.   
 
 Figure 15 shows the remaining four terms, with two terms representing 
cognitive limitations (threshold noise and integrative leak) and two terms 
Figure 15: Estimated Subject Parameters: Each parameter is shown 
plotted by each condition, high threshold and low threshold in the x and 
y axis, respectively (far left, blue) integration leak (middle left, green)_ 
threshold noise (middle right, red) threshold starting value (far right, 
light blue) threshold slope.  Optimal parameter values are shown in 
diamonds.  Mean values with standard error bars are shown in black.  
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representing the decision threshold.  Loosely speaking, the cognitive limitation 
parameters do not vary systematically between conditions while the threshold 
parameters bias appropriately.  The integrative leak parameters are shown as 
they were implemented in the model, as the base of an exponential (IL^x; x is 
the sample number).  However, these values can be converted to half-life 
values that are fairly reasonable (1^x = Inf half life).  The mean half-lives for 
the subjects were 5.70 in the high threshold condition and 3.74 in the low 
threshold condition.  The difference in half-life between the two conditions 
was not significant (t(5) = 1.18, p = 0.290, sd = 4.04).  It is also clear that 
neither the threshold slope nor threshold noise, when expressed as a function of 
threshold, differed significantly between conditions.  Instead, both of these 
parameter are highly correlated by subject (noise/threshold r(4) = 0.94, p < 
0.05; slope r(4) = 0.87, p < 0.05).   
 One may also question why the integrative leak, as a "cognitive 
limitation" parameter, should vary at all.  If these parameter values truly 
represent a cognitive limitation, should not these parameters be fixed for a 
particular person, and only vary slightly from subject to subject?  To answer 
this, one must accept that these terms are used loosely, and that any number of 
factors may be influencing integrative leak.  However, their general alertness 
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and motivation may have changed significantly with the few days between the 
two conditions.   
 The fact that the threshold slope did not change between conditions, but 
was highly correlated by subject, shows that this variable is not easily adapted 
by the subject to account for conditions.  This result requires a reinterpretation 
of it as a "decision threshold" parameter, and may be better thought of as a 
cognitive limitation.  This issue will be further explored in the discussion.  
 The threshold starting value is the only value that varied significantly 
between conditions (t(5) = 4.96, p = <.01, m diff. = 1.53, sd = 0.75), leading to 
the conclusion that subjects did have enough control over this parameter to 
adapt it two the different reward structures.  However, the subjects' thresholds 
were also significantly greater than the ideal (marked with a diamond), though 
only for the high threshold condition (t(5) = 2.28, p = <.05, m diff. = 0.35, sd = 
0.38),.  
 
6.3 Optimality of Decision Thresholds 
   As described in section 6.2, interpretation of subjects’ performance in 
the task changes when incorporating cognitive limitations.    To illustrate the 
value of this overall approach, I first show the performance of the threshold 
parameters without regards to any cognitive limitations (Figure 16, right), then 
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Figure 16:  Comparison: expected reward surfaces as a function of 
threshold slope (y-axis) and starting value (x-axis).  (Left)  scores are 
accumulated with threshold noise and integrative leak. (Right) with no 
cognitive limitations (Blue diamond: subject value) (Black diamond: 
Surface Maximum) Contours at 2 and 5 pts are shown. The subject 
threshold values are near optimal when factoring cognitive limitations 
(left), and not when ignoring them (right).  Furthermore, sensitivity to 
deviations becomes greater, shown by the greater drop-off of reward as 
one deviates from optimal values.   
show how this changes when an expected rewards curve that follows the 
cognitive limitations are introduced (figure 16, left).  Each pixel of both plots 
is generated simply by accumulating trials with the model and obtaining an 
average score. Figure 14 (left) was done with the threshold values shown and 
no cognitive limitations. Figure 14 (right) was generated the same way, except 
in every pixel, the model was run with the cognitive limitation parameters of a 
particular subject. Observe the maxima, and subject values, which are plotted 
with black and blue crosses, respectively.  In the graph without the cognitive 
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limitations, the subject has the same slope, but chooses a threshold lower than 
ideal.  This choice of threshold parameters seems particular poor because, 
though the deviation from ideal is slight, it is in a direction that yields a nearly 
maximal loss.  However, when one considers the cognitive limitations, the 
subjects chosen threshold is nearly ideal.  Furthermore, the overall shape of the 
surface becomes tighter, indicating stiffer penalties for deviations from ideal   
 Figures 17-20, show all subject performances in this same manner. In 
general, most subjects show an improvement when viewed with respect to their 
cognitive limitations. However, the effect is much less pronounced in the low 
threshold condition than the high threshold condition.  The possible reasons for 
this are explored in the discussion section.  
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Figure 17: Comparison: (subjects 1-3) expected reward surfaces as a 
function of threshold slope (y-axis) and starting value (x-axis).  (Left)  
scores are accumulated with threshold noise and integrative leak. (Right) 
with no cognitive limitations (Blue diamond: subject value) (Black 
diamond: Surface Maximum) Contours at 2 and 5 pts are shown. The 
subject threshold values are closer to optimal when factoring cognitive 
limitations (left), and not when ignoring them (right).  Furthermore, 
sensitivity to deviations becomes greater, shown by the greater drop-off of 
reward as one deviates from optimal values.   
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Figure 18: Comparison: (subjects 4-6 cond. 1) expected reward surfaces as a 
function of threshold slope (y-axis) and starting value (x-axis).  (Left)  
scores are accumulated with threshold noise and integrative leak. (Right) 
with no cognitive limitations. (Blue diamond: subject value) (Black 
diamond: Surface Maximum) Contours at 2 and 5 pts are shown. The 
subject threshold values are closer to optimal when factoring cognitive 
limitations (left), and not when ignoring them (right).  Furthermore, 
sensitivity to deviations becomes greater, shown by the greater drop-off of 
reward as one deviates from optimal values.   
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Figure 19: Comparison: (subjects 1-3 cond. 2) expected reward surfaces as a 
function of threshold slope (y-axis) and starting value (x-axis).  (Left)  scores 
are accumulated with threshold noise and integrative leak. (Right) with no 
cognitive limitations. (Blue diamond: subject value) (Black diamond: Surface 
Maximum) Contours at 2 and 5 pts are shown. The subject threshold values 
are closer to optimal when factoring cognitive limitations (left), and not when 
ignoring them (right).  However, this effect is less clear in this condition. 
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Figure 20: Comparison (subjects 4-6 cond. 2): expected reward surfaces as a 
function of threshold slope (y-axis) and starting value (x-axis).  (Left)  scores are 
accumulated with threshold noise and integrative leak. (Right) with no cognitive 
limitations. (Blue diamond: subject value) (Black diamond: Surface Maximum) 
Contours at 2 and 5 pts are shown. The subject threshold values are closer to 
optimal when factoring cognitive limitations (left), and not when ignoring them 
(right).  However, this effect is less clear in this condition   
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Chapter 7:  DISCUSSION 
 This dissertation is an example of research that has learned from the 
more recent conceptual lessons of psychology. Works like Marr's influential 
Vision (1982) realized the notion that understanding a cognitive process 
required more than an algorithmic description. To truly understand a cognitive 
function, one must both understand the underlying physical mechanism and the 
function's role in helping the organism deal with adversity caused by the 
environment. This latter realization of the relationship between a cognitive 
function and the organism's environment has, for example, been exploited to 
show that some cognitive limitations, such as memory, have adapted to the 
environmental task demands (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). In another 
example, a detailed study of typical visual data allowed Geisler & Diehl (2003) 
to hypothesize a specific visual filter simply because it would be the most 
useful. This dissertation began with a demonstration (Chapter 2) that the 
environmental reward structure, cognitive limitations, and optimal task 
behavior are inextricably linked. One cannot realistically evaluate human 
performance against optimal behavior without taking both into account. 
Though these issues are linked, the problem for psychological researchers is 
that within each experiment there are two unknowns. First, there was the 
primary issue of this research: can people adapt their specific decision  
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thresholds to a specific environmental reward structure? The second issue was 
that the specific cognitive limitations in this task were unknown. The 
experimental design and computational analysis tried to exploit the relationship 
by solving for these unknowns simultaneously.  
 However, before this could be done, it had to be clear that the main 
question of this research, evaluating human abilities to optimize a decision 
threshold, was a valid psychological concept. In Chapter 3, I first showed that, 
historically, the concept of a decision threshold was not initially popular due to 
the discovery that subjects use heuristics for many probabilistic tasks. 
Subsequent research suggested an appropriate context for this research: short 
probabilistic decisions where heuristics are not easily accessible. I explored the 
distinctions between sequential probabilistic reasoning tasks in which a 
decision threshold may be studied, and used those distinctions to motivate the 
specific design of the current task. Specifically, the task presents uncertain 
evidence sequentially, requiring the subject to evaluate whether they have 
enough information to make the decision in light of a clearly defined reward 
structure. Subjects are motivated to find an optimal balance between random 
guessing and indecisiveness but cannot necessarily use a sufficing heuristic to 
adequately perform the task.  
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 The results of our experiment showed that people can perform the task 
at a reasonable level (average score, figure 14, bottom row). Looking at the 
histograms of samples, subjects approximate the spread of samples that the 
ideal observer makes. Though subjects perform far from optimally (figure 14, 
bottom row), they generally outperformed the optimal behavior of the ideal 
performance of a model with one or two-sample memory. From this, one can 
conclude the subjects are, to some extent, integrating probabilistic information 
across multiple samples, which is different from performance in the related 
weather prediction task (Gluck, et al, 2002). Though we can say that subjects 
are not using a singleton (one sample) strategy or a heuristic, it is impossible to 
be certain that subjects are using a more sophisticated strategy. However, when 
interviewing each subject, none of them reported using a single explicit 
strategy across all trials. In fact, many reported that, while subjects were 
motivated to perform the task well, they gave up using any strategy due to the 
sheer number of trials.  
 At first glance of the decision threshold parameters (Figure 15), one 
might conclude that subjects did not approximate an ideal threshold, especially 
one defined with a perfectly integrating ideal observer. Instead, subjects only 
reacted appropriately to the different reward structures in an appropriate way, 
lowering or increasing their threshold along with changes in the reward 
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structure. Though this effect is significant (t(5) = 4.96, p<0.05, mean 
difference = 1.53, sd = 0.75), each subject's threshold values are also 
significantly higher than threshold.  
 This interpretation, that subject cannot approximate ideal behavior,  
changes when looking at the model parameters rather than the descriptive 
variables of the analysis scheme (Figures 16-20).  Many subjects chose the 
starting level of their threshold to optimize their overall score.  Those subjects 
that did not chose thresholds that were still on the relative “top” of the reward 
surface, accruing only small penalties.   
Though it could be said that subjects performance will always look 
better compared to a sub-ideal model, Figures 17-20 also show that the criteria 
for well-placed thresholds becomes narrower with cognitive limitations.  In 
fact, the parameter region which would be nearly optimal on the reward 
surfaces without cognitive limits (lower right quadrant) becomes a space where 
subjects would actually accrue serious penalties.   
Subjects did, however, show a difference in their ability to optimize in 
the high and low-threshold condition.  Since the order of the conditions was 
counterbalanced, this cannot be a learning effect. Instead, this difference could 
be explained by the difference in the sharpness of the expected reward curves 
(Figure 7).   It could be that the low-threshold condition had too flat of a curve 
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to motivate subjects to learn the precise maximum, whether factoring cognitive 
limitations or not. This flat maxima hypothesis has been shown other situations 
(Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1982; Bohil & Maddox, 2001).  
It is interesting that few subjects biased their parameters towards the 
lower right side of the space.  This region of the space represents the subjects 
accruing so much information that, while the subjects are accurate, they have 
already incurred a large penalty from the information’s cost.  Maddox & Bohil 
(2004) showed that, in a probabilistic decision-making task, subjects tended to 
bias towards this region, leading them to hypothesize that subjects chose to 
optimize their accuracy as opposed to their overall score.  Since our subjects 
did not show this effect, one can assume subjects in this case, were not trying 
to be overly accurate.  However, exposing the critical differences between the 
experiments would require a new line of research.     
There are many other extensions of this research that would further our 
collective knowledge about peoples' ability to adapt their threshold for making 
probabilistic decisions. For example, though the visual stimulus was designed 
to eliminate heuristic processing, modifications could be made to the "front-
end" to explore exactly what cues will prompt a heuristic approach. 
Comparisons between different conditions could still be done with few 
modifications to the analysis scheme. On the other hand, the overall approach 
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of this research is also compatible with "lower-level" reasoning tasks where the 
neurological bases for the processes are currently being explored. (Yang & 
Shadlen, 2007).   
These extensions would not be possible if this dissertation was not 
productive.  Not only does it show that cognitive limitations are critically 
important to a rigorous study of decision thresholds, this research also provides 
a framework: a task, an analysis scheme, a model of internal processes, and 
ways to explore optimal behavior.  Each one of these can be easily modified to 
provide new insight.  
 
6.1 Epilogue 
 Though I have provided a detailed framework for studying decision 
thresholds, motivated and informed by a variety of research, and provided 
results that promise a wealth of information about a neglected aspect of 
decision making, I end with a quote that demonstrates an opinion that this 
research is critically important to psychology and society in general:  
 
 A habit of basing convictions upon evidence, and giving to them only 
 that degree of certainty which the evidence warrants would, if it 
 became general, cure most of the ills from which the world is suffering.  
        -Bertrand Russell 
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Though grandiose, it is quite possible that Russell believed that people are not 
appropriating the correct amount of confidence based on the given information, 
and this is something that causes the worlds ills.  This dissertation shows that it 
is possible to perform rigorous research that examines this very issue.     
74 
Appendix:  Nonparametric Analysis 
 When this project first began, it was unknown whether subjects’ 
consistently biased their valuation of each sample when integrating its’ associated 
evidence into a previously-held belief.  One could plausibly expect to find that 
subjects would bias both the first and last samples observed in each trial, or that 
the weights did not vary consistently from trial to trial.  An initial nonparameteric 
analysis was done to explore the nature of this bias.  
 Since I was initially agnostic about how bias might behave, I chose to use 
a different set of weights for trials of each sample length. So, I found one weight 
for one sample trials, two weights for two sample trials, and so on.  The only 
assumption of this analysis is that the bias of theses weightings can be expressed 
as a simple multiplicative term on the evidence of each sample. Thus, the 
weighted evidence for all trials becomes: 
 
for all i samples in the trial.  We can then apply the model of a threshold and some 
form of noise about this threshold.  By integrating this model across the range of x 
(stimulus distance from the middle of the screen), we can define a probability for 
all possible actions at a given sample i, The probability of declaring the left 
distribution, the right distribution, and choosing another sample are as follows:   
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 Under the assumption that the threshold is fixed, one can then obtain 
weights that maximize the overall probability of subject data. Figure 13 shows the 
combined estimates for weights w
ij 
in each condition. Weights for trials of each 
length are shown in a single color. One can think of each line as the memory trace 
for each sample interval. In both graphs, one can see a distinct decay pattern. In 
the top graph (high threshold), the "half-life" of the trace is between three and five 
samples. In the bottom graph (low threshold condition) , the decay is much more 
pronounced. Also, in the low threshold condition, subjects did not have many 
trials where they took more than seven samples. Hence, the weights for this 
scarcity of data did not converge. 
 The decision to use a fixed threshold was not made carelessly, especially 
since it is intuitive that people might lower their decision threshold (be more likely 
to guess) as the trial becomes lengthy. Instead, this possible effect was to be 
described in the trends of the weights.  The threshold was deliberately fixed at the 
ideal threshold, so that each weight could indicate the tendency of the subject to 
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bias their evidence relative to the ideal.  More extensive arguments based on these 
values were abandoned for the approach described in this dissertation.  
Nevertheless, one conclusion drawn was that subjects biased their evidence 
mainly according to a recency effect.  This initial conclusion contributed to the 
decision to include a "leaky integrator" model.  
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Figure A1: combined weights for each subject in each condition 
(high threshold: top graph; low threshold: bottom graph) Weights 
for trials of each length are shown in a single color. Example: 
(top graph) the long red line ending at the 10th sample describes 
all weight values for WE
10
. In the low threshold condition few 
subjects Error bars are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
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